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RECENT NATURAL RESOURCES CASES
WATERCOURSES-RECREATIONAL USES FOR WATER UNDER
PRIOR APPROPRIATION LAW*
In 1937 the Colorado legislature, in order to promote conserva-
tion of the water of the Colorado River,1 created the Colorado River
Water Conservation District and empowered it, inter alia,
To file upon and hold for the use of the public sufficient water of
any natural stream to maintain a constant stream flow in the amount
necessary to preserve fish, and to use such water in connection with re-
taining ponds for the propagation of fish for the benefit of the public.2
In 1965, for the first time, the District, having seen fishing ruined
in one Colorado stream after another, tried to use its power to "file
upon and hold for the use of the public" the waters of three streams
-all tributary to the Colorado River-"for the propagation of fish."
The District became a party in a supplemental adjudication in Rio
Blanco County, Colorado, claiming a right with a priority date of
June 7, 1937 (the effective date of the alleged empowering legisla-
tion). The District specified rates of flow alleged to be necessary for
fish life in the streams involved, and claimed water rights which, if
recognized, would have prevented reduction of the streams below
those amounts by any rights created since June 7, 1937. The Supreme
Court of Colorado affirmed the trial court in denying the District the
water rights it claimed.3
The supreme court based its decision on two grounds: ( 1) there is
no authority for the proposition that a water right may be acquired
for purpose of fish propagation without making a diversion from
the stream, and (2) the legislature did not intend to depart from
* Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d
798 (Colo. 1965).
1. Colo. Laws 1937, ch. 220 § 1, p. 997, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150-7-1 (1963).
2. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 150-7-5(10) (1963). (Emphasis added.)
3. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406
P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965).
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"well established doctrine requiring a diversion to complete an ap-
propriation. ' 4 The court's reasoning is surprising. Not only because
it is circular, but because in 1960 it had held that diversion from the
stream was not necessary to create a water right. In Genoe v. West-
fall,5 the court had allowed a water right for cattle watering without
a diversion. The opinion in the present case did not mention Genoe.
The Colorado Supreme Court now has two lines of authority: one
holding diversion not a necessary requirement for the creation of a
water right, and another holding that diversion is a necessary require-
ment. The court was right in Genoe and wrong in this case. Beneficial
use is the crux of a water right, and if water can be put to beneficial
use without a diversion then the requirement of a diversion serves
no useful purpose.
It is much more likely that the Colorado court denied the claim of
the District because it was a very large and unusual claim. The court
was not willing to believe the legislature had sanctioned such a claim
in the absence of a statute considerably more explicit than that relied
upon by the District. The District's claim does indeed appear large
and unusual when compared to the normal water right. Although it
would neither divert nor consume any water, the District wanted to
make all unclaimed water in these three streams unavailable for any
use. By hiding behind the false requirement of a diversion, and
thereby failing to analyze the real nature of the District's claim, the
Colorado court sidestepped one of the more troublesome problems
of western water law.
One advantage of western prior appropriation water law is that
water rights are saleable apart from land. The system, ideally, en-
courages the creation of a water market which tends to allocate
water to the highest economic uses available in the area. One of the
principal blind spots in this system is the recreational use of natural
streams and lakes.
Preservation of natural recreational facilities has economic value
for the entire area affected," but by its very nature there is no one to
4. 406P.2d at800:
There is no support in the law of this state for the proposition that a mini-
mum flow of water may be 'appropriated' in a natural stream for piscatorial
purposes without diversion of any portion of the water 'appropriated' from the
natural course of the stream. By the enactment of C.R.S.1963, 150-7-5(10) the
legislature did not intend to bring about such an extreme departure from well
established doctrine, and we hold that no such departure was brought about
by said statute.
5. 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960).
6. The Value of Water in Alternative Uses, app. D (Wollman ed. 1962).
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bid for it in the market; that is, the economic benefit is spread so wide-
ly that no one can afford to pay more than a tiny fraction of its true
value. As a result, the market system allocates no water for natural
recreational purposes.
It is apparent that if such purposes are to receive any portion of
available western water they must do so outside the water market.
Several western states have recognized this truth. The Oregon legis-
lature has withdrawn certain streams from the appropriation system,
and thus preserved them in their natural condition.' Other state legis-
latures have delegated this power to state agencies that are in a
position to make wise decisions about which streams and lakes could
best be withdrawn from the market system and preserved as they
are today.9
Obviously, the section of the Colorado River Conservation Dis-
trict Act relied upon by the District was an attempt by the Colorado
legislature to delegate the power to withdraw certain waters from the
market system to the District in which those streams are located.'"
The District would seem to be an excellent choice for the delegation
of this power. It is concerned with all aspects of water use and not just
protection of fish, or conservation. Its board of directors is made up
of citizens of the counties within its jurisdiction," men who represent
the localities that would be most affected by the preservation of nat-
ural streams, as well as by the detrimental effects of withdrawing their
waters from the market.
Perhaps the greatest objection that can be made to the District's
argument is that the power it claims has been granted without any
guiding standards for its use. Several methods of evaluating recrea-
tional uses have been suggested. 2 In the absence of any instructions
from the legislature on how to select the amount and location of water
7. This, of course, is not true of private fishing clubs and the like. Such private fa-
cilities cannot meet the entire need for recreational facilities. Conservation of beauty
is also a human need not met by the market system in water rights. See the eloquent
opinion of Chief Judge Duffy in Namekagon Hydro Co. v. FPC, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.
1954).
8. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 538.110 to .300 (Supp. 1965). See generally Trelease, Bloomen-
thai & Geroud, Cases and materials on Natural Resources 54-62 (1965).
9. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 75.20.100 (1963) ; Idaho Code Ann. §§ 67-4301 to -4306
(1949). The Idaho statute is a delegation of power in form only. It grants to the gov-
ernor power to appropriate certain named lakes.
10. The same delegation is contained in Colorado's Southwestern Water Conserva-
tion District Act. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150-8-5 (10) (1963).
11. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 150-7-3 (1963).
12. See Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and
Public Regulation, 5 Natural Resources J. 1, 18-23 (1965).
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to be withdrawn from waters available for appropriation, serious
constitutional objections could be made to the attempted grant of
power. Furthermore, assuming a constitutional grant of power to the
District, the District in attempting to acquire a 1937 water right was
trying to use its power improperly.
One of the unique things about the type of water right the District
was claiming is the fact that fishermen along the banks of a stream
give no notice to the public that a water right is or may later be
claimed for all the remaining water in the stream. The District's argu-
ment that its acts of constructing camp grounds, access roads, and fish
hatcheries, and the stocking of the streams evidenced the intention of
the public to appropriate the waters was hardly fair to those who per-
fected rights after 1937 in reliance upon the amount of flow they
could observe and the claims listed in the State Engineer's Office. The
Colorado court would be on solid ground if it would hold that the Dis-
trist is not entitled to a right under the act with a priority any earlier
than the "filing" which the act requires. The fact that a filing is not
neccesary to create an ordinary water right in Colorado" has no bear-
ing on the requirements for the creation of this special right under the
Act. Presumably the "filing" should be made with the Colorado State
Engineer, since his office is charged with keeping a record of all water
rights and is the place where inquiries are made to determine whether
there is unclaimed water in a particular stream.'
The decision in this case could be seen as a construction of this act
requiring the District to maintain stream flow from waters diverted
into, off, or on stream reservoirs and released during dry seasons. It
is doubtful that this was the legislature's meaning, however. In other
portions of the act the District was specifically empowered to con-
struct dams and reservoirs. The power to "file upon and hold for the
use of the public sufficient water . .. to maintain a constant stream
flow" is separate and distinct from the sections discussing dams and
reservoirs.
However, the opinion in Colorado Water Conservation Dist. seems
to disallow altogether the kind of water right sought. The court
seems to have held that although a diversion is not necessary to per-
fect a water right for stock watering purposes, it is necessary to
perfect a right for "piscatorial purposes." If this is the case, it is
difficult to read any meaning into that part of the statute granting the
District power to acquire a water right "to maintain a constant stream
13. DeHass v. Benesch, 116 Colo. 344, 181 P.2d 453 (1947).
14. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 148-4-1 to -4-7 (1963).
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flow." Obviously, the maintenance of stream flow to preserve fish life
in the stream and the requirement of a diversion are inconsistent. The
statute has now been amended by the court to grant only the power to
acquire water rights for fish ponds.
The extra-market protection of some natural resources is impor-
tant to a balanced water economy. The Colorado legislature should
try again. This time, however, it should specify the means by which
the agency is to choose the amount and location of the water to be
withdrawn.
WILLIS H. ELLIS t
t Visiting Associate Professor of Law, The University of New Mexico, Albuquerque.
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